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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE O. BISHOP, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
CHARLES HOLLIS NIELSEN, 
vs. 
Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff-
Respondent, Case No. 17082 
GENICE GAY BISHOP, 
Third-Party Defendant-
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action filed by plaintiff, George o. Bishop, 
Jr., against defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, for property 
damage incurred to plaintiff's vehicle in an automobile accident. 
Defendant filed a third-party complaint against the driver of 
plaintiff's vehicle, Genice Gay Bishop, for damage incurred by 
defendant's vehicle and for contribution upon plaintiff's cause 
of action against defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff, George o. Bishop, Jr., and third-party 
defendant, Genice Gay Bishop, originally filed a motion for a 
-1-
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partial summary judgment to dismiss the contribution claim 
against third-party defendant, by reason of the fact that Genice 
Gay Bishop cannot be a joint tort feasor with the defendant. The 
motion was denied by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on August 
13, 1979. 
The trial of the above-captioned matter was held, and 
third-party defendant, Genice Gay Bishop, made a motion for a 
directed verdict to dismiss the contribution action against her 
on the same grounds that were urged at the motion for partial 
summary judgment. The motion for a directed verdict was denied, 
by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, during the course of the trial, 
and the jury was presented with a "Special Verdict" to answer 
interrogatories concerning the negligence and liability of 
defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, and third-party defendant, 
Genice Gay Bishop. 
The jury apportioned negligence of 70% to defendant and 
30% to third-party defendant, Genice Gay Bishop. Judgment was 
rendered pursuant to the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, 
George o. Bishop, Jr., against defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, 
for 100% of plaintiff's damages, $664.97, and a judgment was also 
rendered in favor of defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, againt 
third-party defendant, Genice Gay Bishop, for $199.49, repre-
senting 30% of the total damages incurred by plaintff, George o. 
Bishop, Jr. 
-2-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Third-party defendant, Genice Gay Bishop seeks to have 
the judgment rendered against her in contribution overturned, and 
to have the order denying the motion for a directed verdict 
reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 15, 1977, the third-party defendant, Genice Gay 
Bishop, was involved in an automobile accident with the 
defendant, Charles Nielsen. (R. 15, 142, 368) At the time of 
the accident, the third-party defendant was driving an automobile 
which belonged to her father, the plaintiff. (R. 362, 368, 394) 
In May of 1978, George Bishop instituted an action against the 
defendant to recover for the damages his automobile sustained in 
the accident. (R. 15, 362, 393) The defendant filed a third-
party complaint against the third-party defendant for 
contribution. (R. 15, 363, 393) 
The third-party defendant was born on June 30, 1960. 
(R. 108, 368) On July 15, 1977, the date of the accident, she 
was 17 years old. (R. 368, 394) She was single and lived at home 
with her parents, Mr. and Mrs. George O. Bishop, who were her 
sole means of support. (R. 106, 108, 362, 368, 394) 
Plaintiff, George o. Bishop, Jr., and third-party 
defendant, Genice Gay Bishop, filed a motion for a partial sum-
mary judgment to dismiss the contribution claim filed by defen-
dant on the basis that the third-party defendant was the uneman-
-3-
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cipated minor child of the plaintiff at the time of the automo-
bile accident and therefore cannot be a joint tort feasor respon-
sible for her father's damage, on the basis of the intra-family 
immunity doctrine. The motion for partial summary judgment was 
denied on August 13, 1979. (R. 244-245) A notice of intent to 
appeal the denial of the motion for partial summary judgment was 
filed on August 13, 1979. (R. 246-247) 
At the trial of the lawsuit, plaintiff and third-party 
defendant moved the court for a directed verdict in favor of 
third-party defendant upon the third-party complaint again urging 
the court that a contribution action against the third-party 
defendant was improper because of the "intra-family immunity 
doctrine. The court denied the motion on the basis that the 
denial of the partial summary judgment by Judge Wilkinson became 
the law of the case. (R. 400) 
The jury was submitted the case on a "Special Verdict" 
and apportioned negligence in the amount of 70% against 
defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, and 30% against third-party 
defendant, Genice Gay Bishop. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH COURTS HAVE IMPLICITLY ADOPTED 
THE INTRA-FAMILY IMMUNITY DOCTRINE. 
The intra-family immunity doctrine provides that a 
parent cannot sue his or her unemancipated child in tort. The 
doctrine first emerged in the American judicial system in 1891, 
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with Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1981). In that 
case a minor child brought an action against her mother for false 
imprisonment. The Mississippi court promulgated a rule denying a 
minor child the right to sue his parents for personal tort. The 
court said: 
The peace of society, and the families 
composing society, and a sound public 
policy, designed to subserve the repose 
of families and the best interests of 
society, forbid to the minor child the 
right to appear in court in the assertion 
of a claim to civil redress for personal 
injuries suffered at the hands of the 
parent. Id. at 887. 
Courts upholding the intra-family immunity doctrine have 
rationalized it on three grounds; danger of fraud or collusion, 
preservation of family tranquility and parental discipline, and 
compliance with the intra-spousal immunity doctrine. The Iowa 
Supreme Court recently upheld the family immunity doctrine 
reasoning: 
We believe that the family unit, which is 
basic to all cultures and societies, and 
vitally important to ours, should not 
include in its internal structure a con-
cept of recompensable fault in cases of 
ordinary negligence involving the family 
relationship. Moreover, we are satisfied 
that the arguments advanced for the 
rejection of the family immunity doctrine 
are fundamentally unsound, are utterly 
and completely repugnant and foreign to a 
harmonious family relationship, and feel 
they erroneously attempt to equate all 
human behavior in mere monetary values. 
Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105, 109, 
(Iowa, 1968). 
-s-
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In Nahas v. Noble, 420 P.2d 127 (N.M. 1966), the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico upheld the family immunity doctrine and 
dismissed the plaintiff's mother's action against her daughter, 
even though the daughter had been emancipated subsequent to the 
injury but prior to the commencement of the action. The plain-
tiff had been injured in an automobile accident. At the time of 
the accident, the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile 
driven by her daughter. With reference to the fact that the 
child was not liable to her mother, the court stated: 
Suits by a parent against the child tend 
to disrupt the family relationship 
because of the antagonism implicit in 
such suits. There is an inconsistency 
between the parent's position as the 
natural guardian of the child and the 
parent's position as plaintiff demanding 
damages from the child. • • It is 
repugnant to the prevailing sense of 
propriety that a mother should bring an 
action at law against her own minor 
child. [Citations omitted] 
Encouragement of family unity and the 
maintenance of family discipline being 
sound public policy, we hold that a 
parent cannot maintain an action in 
negligence against an unemancipated minor 
child. Id. at 128. 
The court went on to hold that an action could not be brought by 
a parent against his or her child if the child was an uneman-
cipated minor child at the time of the accident, even though the 
child had been emancipated prior to the trial. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has never dealt with the 
question of intra-family immunity, they did uphold the intra-
spousal immunity doctrine in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 
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344, 384 P.2d 389 (Utah, 1963). In that case a wife sued the 
estate of her husband for injuries she received in an automobile-
train accident. Her husband was the driver, and she was a 
passenger in the automobile. The Utah Supreme Court held that a 
wife cannot maintain a tort action against her husband. The 
court based their decision on the need for protecting family 
solidarity. They also noted that where insurance is involved, 
the spouses would have a common interest in the outcome, thus 
encouraging collusion. The court said: 
It has always been the law of our state, 
insofar as we have been able to 
ascertain, that a suit of this character 
could not be maintained. It is inevi-
table that this has been assumed to be 
the law. • • We are of the opinion that 
under these circumstances in fairness to 
those who have relied thereon, and in 
proper deference to the solidarity of 
the law, any change could be justified 
only to correct patent error, otherwise 
it should be made by the legislature, 
plainly so declaring, so that all may be 
advised what the change is and wnen it 
will be effective. Id. at 393. 
In two subsequent cases, the Utah Supreme Court con-
tinued to uphold the doctrine of intra-spousal immunity. In 
Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Utah, 1974), the court upheld the 
Utah's guest statute upon the rationale of preventing collusive 
actions. The court refused to follow the California decision 
which had overruled the guest statute, and the intra-family and 
the intra-spousal immunity doctrine on the ground that the possi-
bility of collusive actions was not sufficient justification for 
-7-
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the doctrine. The Utah court reiterated its belief that the 
legislature, and not the court, was the proper forum for changing 
such rules. In 1978, the court again upheld the intra-spousal 
immunity doctrine in Hull v. Silver, 577 P.2d 103 (Utah, 1978). 
The courts that have abrogated intra-family immunity 
have rationalized their decisions on the grounds that the injury 
has already been sustained and therefore family harmony has been 
disturbed. Furthermore, because most families are covered by 
insurance, the real parties in the action are the insurance 
companies, not the family members. Tamashiro v. De Gama, 450 
P.2d 998 (Hawaii, 1969). The Utah Supreme Court has expressly 
rejected this reasoning. In Rubalcava v. Gisseman, the court 
rebutted the insurance argument saying: 
The question of liability can be ascer-
tained justly only upon its own merits. 
Whether there is insurance or not is 
immaterial to this determination. 
However, the fact cannot be ignored that 
where there is insurance, and this is 
known to both parties, the temptation to 
collusion exists; and this is increased 
when the supposedly adverse parties are 
in the symbiotic relationship of husband 
and wife. The risk of loss, and the 
natural reaction to defend against a 
charge of wrong, may be negligible or 
non-existent; and are supplanted by the 
covert hope of mutual benefit. Id. at 
391. (Emphasis added) 
The court also upheld the family harmony argument, 
noting that such an action would "weaken the foundation of [the] 
relationship because when troubles arise • • • the parties would 
-8-
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then suspect each other's integrity." Id. at 392. 
The rationale the Utah Supreme Court has relied upon in 
upholding the intra-spousal immunity doctrine is equally appli-
cable to the intra-family immunity doctrine. The need to main-
tain family harmony and to protect against collusive actions 
between parent and child dictate a need for the intra-family 
immunity doctrine. As the court has noted on two occasions, if 
the doctrine is to be abrogated, the proper forum for such a 
change is the legislature, not the court. Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 
supra; Cannon v. Oviatt, supra. Thus, it is clear that the Utah 
, Supreme Court has strongly upheld the rationale behind the intra-
spousal and intra-family immunity docrines. 
There is no dispute that on the day of the automobile 
accident involved in this matter, the third-party defendant, 
Genice Gay Bishop, was 17 years old, (R. 368, 394), and was 
single and living at home with her parents, Mr. and Mrs. George 
o. Bishop, who were her sole means of support. (R. 106, 108, 
362, 368, 394) The intra-family immunity doctrine that has at 
least been implicitly adopted by the Utah Supreme Court would 
prevent an action by plaintiff, George o. Bishop, Jr., against 
his unemancipated minor child, Genice Gay Bishop, for the damages 
incurred to plaintiff's vehicle as a result of any negligence of 
his daughter. 
-9-
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A 
JUDGMENT FOR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST THE 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT IS NOT A JOINT TORT 
FEASOR. 
In granting a judgment for contribution against the 
third-party defendant, the trial court committed error in either 
failing to affirm and recognize the intra-family immunity 
doctrine as in existence in the State of Utah, or in failing to 
apply the doctrine to a contribution cause of action. 
Under Utah law, the right to contribution exists only 
against one who is "jointly or severally liable in tort for the 
same injury." U.C.A. 78-27-40(3) (1973). This statute provides 
that, "The right of contribution shall exist upon joint tort 
feasors •• 
feasor as: 
n 
. ' 
U.C.A. 78-27-39 (1973), and defines a joint tort 
One of two or more persons jointly or 
severally liable in tort for the same 
injury to person or property, whether or 
not a judgment has been recovered against 
all or some of them. U.C.A. §78-27-40(3) 
(1973). 
Under this statute, therefore, though a person has been 
negligent with reference to a particular injury, he will not be 
liable for contribution to that injury where he is not liable for 
that injury himself. Thus, Genice Bishop cannot be liable to her 
father, as a third-party defendant, because he could not sue 
Genice under the intra-family immunity doctrine. 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the contribution 
-10-
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statute in Curtis v. Harmon Electronic Co., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah, 
1976). In that case, a passenger was injured when the car he was 
riding in collided with a railroad car. The car was driven by a 
co-worker who was acting in the course of his employment. The 
passenger recovered from his employer's Workmen's Compensation 
insurance. He then brought an action against the railroad for 
negligence. The railroad tried to join the passenger's employer 
on a joint tort feasor and contribution theory. The court held 
that the employee's only remedy against his employer was under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act, and therefore the employer could 
not be a "tort feasor" and could not be liable for contribution 
under Utah's contribution statute. 
Following this same reasoning, several courts have held 
that a party who is not liable to the plaintiff due to the intra-
family immunity doctrine, will not be liable to the defendant for 
contribution. In Faul v. Dennis, 118 N.J.Supr. 338, 287 A.2d 470 
(N.J. 1972), the plaintiff, an unemancipated minor child, was 
injured while a passenger in a car driven by his mother. The 
plaintiff sued the other driver involved in the collision, who 
brought in the mother as a third-party defendant for 
contribution. The New Jersey court stated: 
Since the infant plaintiff lacks a cause 
of action due to the immunity of the 
parent, no claim for contribution may be 
made against defendant (mother) by the 
other defendants who are liable for the 
infant's injuries. Id. at 473. 
-11-
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Similarly, in American Auto Ins. co. v. Malling, 57 
N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1953), defendant was involved in a collision in 
which his wife was injured. The wife brought an action against 
the other driver for personal injuries and recovered. The other 
driver's insurance then sued the defendant for contribution. The 
court held that the husband was not a joint tort feasor under the 
intra-spousal immunity doctrine and thus was not liable for 
contribution. The court said: 
While the present action is not by the 
wife against the husband but is brought 
against the husband by the subrogee of 
the joint tort feasor, nevertheless the 
immunity of the husband from liability to 
his wife does destroy a necessary element 
of the action for contribution, and, 
consequently, is a good defense to such 
an action. Id. at 849. 
This principle was reaffirmed by that court in Nelson v. Home 
Decorating Co. v. Nelson, 109 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1961). 
Thus it is clear that where the intra-family immunity 
doctrine bars a party from liability for an injury, that party 
will not be liable for contribution for that injury. The fact 
that the parties are generally covered by liability insurance 
also militates against allowing an action for contribution 
against a family member. 
The presence of liability insurance in 
such instances may lead to fraud, or at 
least collusive, or at best friendly 
suits, the parent may encourage his minor 
child to bring such an action against 
him. This is not a far fetched 
possibility. Not only is it contrary to 
good faith, but it also has the tendency 
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of promoting cyn1c1sm and lack of 
integrity ••• [which] the law should 
not encourage. Dennis v. Walker, 284 
F.Supp. 413, 417 (1968). 
Utah has recognized and affirmed the intra-spousal 
immunity doctrine, Rubalcava v. Gisseman, and by doing so, the 
Utah Supreme Court has indirectly approved of the intra-family 
immunity doctrine. Consequently, Genice Bishop cannot be liable 
to her father for the damages his automobile sustained in the 
accident. Since Utah law only recognizes an action for contribu-
tion among joint tort feasors, Genice Bishop cannot be liable in 
contribution to Charles Nielsen, and the lower court committed 
error in denying third-party defendant's motion for directed ver-
diet and in entering a judgment aginst her upon the contribution 
cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
In the present case, the plaintiff, George Bishop, 
brought an action to recover for damages his automobile sustained 
in an accident between his daughter and the defendant. The 
plaintiff's minor daughter was driving his automobile at the time 
of the accident. The defendant, Charles Nielsen, alleged that 
plaintiff's daughter should be liable to him for contribution. 
Since the third-party defendant cannot be liable to her father due 
to the intra-family immunity doctrine, she cannot be liable to 
the defendant, Charles Nielsen. Under the Utah contribution 
statute, it is evident that a party will not be liable for 
contribution if he is not jointly and severally liable with the 
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defendant for the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, where the 
party from whom contribution is sought is not jointly and 
severally liable, due to the intra-family immunity doctrine, 
there can be no action for contribution. Genice Bishop, 
therefore, is not liable for the injury the plaintiff sustained 
and cannot be jointly and severally liable with the defendant for 
that injury. Third-party defendant respectfully requests that 
the judgment against her for contribution be overturned • 
. Respectfully submitted this ...?~of August, 1980. 
STRONG & HANNI 
ByG: 
' R. Scott Williams 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
and Third-Party Defendant-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ~~ of August, 1980, 
two copies of the foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to the following counsel: 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
10 Broadway Building, No. 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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